Lies
being taught;
Mein
Kampf is unintelligible ravings of a maniac.
Now
the Truth; It is the opposite of what press has told
you
CHAPTER
XIII THE GERMAN POST-WAR POLICY OF ALLIANCES
Part 1-
The objects of foreign policies - past
and future.
The
erratic manner in which the foreign affairs of the REICH were conducted was due
to a lack of sound guiding principles for the formation of practical and useful
alliances. Not only was this state of affairs continued after the Revolution,
but it became even worse.
For
the confused state of our political ideas in general before the War may be
looked upon as the chief cause of our defective statesmanship; but in the
post-War period this cause must be attributed to a lack of honest intentions.
It was natural that those parties who had fully achieved their destructive
purpose by means of the Revolution should feel that it would not serve their
interests if a policy of alliances were adopted which must ultimately result in
the restoration of a free German State. A development in this direction would
not be in conformity with the purposes of the November crime. It would have
interrupted and indeed put an end to the internationalization of German
national economy and German Labour. But what was feared most of all was that a
successful effort to make the REICH independent of foreign countries might have
an influence in domestic politics which one day would turn out disastrous for
those who now hold supreme power in the government of the REICH. One cannot
imagine the revival of a nation unless that revival be preceded by a process of
nationalization. Conversely, every important success in the field of foreign
politics must call forth a favourable reaction at home. Experience proves that
every struggle for liberty increases the national sentiment and national
self-consciousness and therewith gives rise to a keener sensibility towards
anti-national elements and tendencies. A state of things, and persons also,
that may be tolerated and even pass unnoticed in times of peace will not only
become the object of aversion when national enthusiasm is aroused but will even
provoke positive opposition, which frequently turns out disastrous for them. In
this connection we may recall the spy-scare that became prevalent when the war
broke out, when human passion suddenly manifested itself to such a heightened
degree as to lead to the most brutal persecutions, often without any
justifiable grounds, although everybody knew that the danger resulting from
spies is greater during the long periods of peace; but, for obvious reasons,
they do not then attract a similar amount of public attention. For this reason
the subtle instinct of the State parasites who came to the surface of the
national body through the November happenings makes them feel at once that a
policy of alliances which would restore the freedom of our people and awaken
national sentiment might possibly ruin their own criminal existence.
Thus
we may explain the fact that since 1918 the men who have held the reins of
government adopted an entirely negative attitude towards foreign affairs and
that the business of the State has been almost constantly conducted in a
systematic way against the interests of the German nation. For that which at
first sight seemed a matter of chance proved, on closer examination, to be a
logical advance along the road which was first publicly entered upon by the
November Revolution of 1918.
Undoubtedly
a distinction ought to be made between (1) the responsible administrators of
our affairs of State, or rather those who ought to be responsible; (2) the
average run of our parliamentary politicasters, and (3) the masses of our
people, whose sheepish docility corresponds to their want of intelligence.
The
first know what they want. The second fall into line with them, either because
they have been already schooled in what is afoot or because they have not the
courage to take an uncompromising stand against a course which they know and
feel to be detrimental. The third just submit to it because they are too stupid
to understand.
While
the German National Socialist Labour Party was only a small and practically
unknown society, problems of foreign policy could have only a secondary
importance in the eyes of many of its members. This was the case especially
because our movement has always proclaimed the principle, and must proclaim it,
that the freedom of the country in its foreign relations is not a gift that
will be bestowed upon us by Heaven or by any earthly Powers, but can only be the
fruit of a development of our inner forces. We must first root out the causes
which led to our collapse and we must eliminate all those who are profiting by
that collapse. Then we shall be in a position to take up the fight for the
restoration of our freedom in the management of our foreign relations.
It
will be easily understood therefore why we did not attach so much importance to
foreign affairs during the early stages of our young movement, but preferred to
concentrate on the problem of internal reform.
But
when the small and insignificant society expanded and finally grew too large
for its first framework, the young organization assumed the importance of a
great association and we then felt it incumbent on us to take a definite stand
on problems regarding the development of a foreign policy. It was necessary to
lay down the main lines of action which would not only be in accord with the
fundamental ideas of our WELTANSCHAUUNG but would actually be an expansion of
it in the practical world of foreign affairs.
Just
because our people have had no political education in matters concerning our
relations abroad, it was necessary to teach the leaders in the various sections
of our movement, and also the masses of the people, the chief principles which
ought to guide the development of our foreign relations. That was one of the
first tasks to be accomplished in order to prepare the ground for the practical
carrying out of a foreign policy which would win back the independence of the
nation in managing its external affairs and thus restore the real sovereignty
of the REICH.
The
fundamental and guiding principles which we must always bear in mind when
studying this question is that foreign policy is only a means to an end and
that the sole end to be pursued is the welfare of our own people. Every problem
in foreign politics must be considered from this point of view, and this point
of view alone. Shall such and such a solution prove advantageous to our people
now or in the future, or will it injure their interests? That is the question.
This
is the sole preoccupation that must occupy our minds in dealing with a
question. Party politics, religious considerations, humanitarian ideals--all
such and all other preoccupations must absolutely give way to this.
Before
the War the purpose to which German foreign policy should have been devoted was
to assure the supply of material necessities for the maintenance of our people
and their children. And the way should have been prepared which would lead to
this goal. Alliances should have been established which would have proved
beneficial to us from this point of view and would have brought us the
necessary auxiliary support. The task to be accomplished is the same to-day,
but with this difference: In pre-War times it was a question of caring for the
maintenance of the German people, backed up by the power which a strong and
independent State then possessed, but our task to-day is to make our nation
powerful once again by re-establishing a strong and independent State. The re-establishment
of such a State is the prerequisite and necessary condition which must be
fulfilled in order that we may be able subsequently to put into practice a
foreign policy which will serve to guarantee the existence of our people in the
future, fulfilling their needs and furnishing them with those necessities of
life which they lack. In other words, the
aim which Germany ought to pursue to-day in her foreign policy is to prepare
the way for the recovery of her liberty to-morrow. In this connection there
is a fundamental principle which we must keep steadily before our minds. It is
this: The possibility of winning back the independence of a nation is not
absolutely bound up with the question of territorial reintegration but it will
suffice if a small remnant, no matter how small, of this nation and State will
exist, provided it possesses the necessary independence to become not only the
vehicle of' the common spirit of the whole people but also to prepare the way
for the military fight to reconquer the nation's liberty.
When a
people who amount to a hundred million souls tolerate the yoke of common
slavery in order to prevent the territory belonging to their State from being
broken up and divided, that is worse than if such a State and such a people were
dismembered while one fragment still retained its complete independence. Of
course, the natural proviso here is that this fragment must be inspired with a
consciousness of the solemn duty that devolves upon it, not only to proclaim
persistently the inviolable unity of its spiritual and cultural life with that
of its detached members but also to prepare the means that are necessary for
the military conflict which will finally liberate and re-unite the fragments
that are suffering under oppression.
One must
also bear in mind the fact that the restoration of lost districts which were
formerly parts of the State, both ethnically and politically, must in the first
instance be a question of winning back political power and independence for the
motherland itself, and that in such cases the special interests of the lost
districts must be uncompromisingly regarded as a matter of secondary importance
in the face of the one main task, which is to win back the freedom of the
central territory. For the detached and
oppressed fragments of a nation or an imperial province cannot achieve their
liberation through the expression of yearnings and protests on the part of the
oppressed and abandoned, but only when the portion which has more or less
retained its sovereign independence can resort to the use of force for the
purpose of reconquering those territories that once belonged to the common
fatherland.
Therefore, in order to reconquer lost
territories the first condition to be fulfilled is to work energetically for
the increased welfare and reinforcement of the strength of that portion of the
State which has remained over after the partition. Thus
the unquenchable yearning which slumbers in the hearts of the people must be
awakened and restrengthened by bringing new forces to its aid, so that when the
hour comes all will be devoted to the one purpose of liberating and uniting the
whole people. Therefore, the interests of the separated territories must be
subordinated to the one purpose. That
one purpose must aim at obtaining for the central remaining portion such a
measure of power and might that will enable it to enforce its will on the
hostile will of the victor and thus redress the wrong. For flaming protests
will not restore the oppressed territories to the bosom of a common REICH. That
can be done only through the might of the sword.
The
forging of this sword is a work that has to be done through the domestic policy
which must be adopted by a national government. To see that the work of forging
these arms is assured, and to recruit the men who will bear them, that is the
task of the foreign policy.
In the
first volume of this book I discussed the inadequacy of our policy of alliances
before the War. There were four possible ways to secure the necessary
foodstuffs for the maintenance of our people. Of these ways the fourth, which
was the most unfavourable, was chosen. Instead of a sound policy of territorial
expansion in Europe, our rulers embarked on a policy of colonial and trade
expansion. That policy was all the more mistaken in as much as they presumed
that in this way the danger of an armed conflict would be averted. The result
of the attempt to sit on many stools at the same time might have been foreseen.
It let us fall to the ground in the midst of them all. And the World War was
only the last reckoning presented to the REICH to pay for the failure of its
foreign policy.
The
right way that should have been taken in those days was the third way I
indicated: namely, to increase the strength of the REICH as a Continental Power
by the acquisition of new territory in Europe. And at the same time a further
expansion, through the subsequent acquisition of colonial territory, might thus
be brought within the range of practical politics. Of course, this policy could
not have been carried through except in alliance with England, or by devoting
such abnormal efforts to the increase of military force and armament that, for
forty or fifty years, all cultural undertakings would have to be completely
relegated to the background. This responsibility might very well have been
undertaken. The cultural importance of a nation is almost always dependent on
its political freedom and independence. Political freedom is a prerequisite
condition for the existence, or rather the creation, of great cultural
undertakings. Accordingly no sacrifice can be too great when there is question
of securing the political freedom of a nation. What might have to be deducted
from the budget expenses for cultural purposes, in order to meet abnormal
demands for increasing the military power of the State, can be generously paid
back later on. Indeed, it may be said that after a State has concentrated all
its resources in one effort for the purpose of securing its political
independence a certain period of ease and renewed equilibrium sets in. And it
often happens that the cultural spirit of the nation, which had been heretofore
cramped and confined, now suddenly blooms forth. Thus Greece experienced the
great Periclean era after the miseries it had suffered during the Persian Wars.
And the Roman Republic turned its energies to the cultivation of a higher
civilization when it was freed from the stress and worry of the Punic Wars.
Of
course, it could not be expected that a parliamentary majority of feckless and
stupid people would be capable of deciding on such a resolute policy for the
absolute subordination of all other national interests to the one sole task of
preparing for a future conflict of arms which would result in establishing the
security of the State. The father of Frederick the Great sacrificed everything
in order to be ready for that conflict; but the fathers of our absurd
parliamentarian democracy could not do it.
That
is why, in pre-War times, the military preparation necessary to enable us to
conquer new territory in Europe was only very mediocre, so that it was
difficult to obtain the support of really helpful allies.
Those
who directed our foreign affairs would not entertain even the idea of
systematically preparing for war. They rejected every plan for the acquisition
of territory in Europe. And by preferring a policy of colonial and trade
expansion, they sacrificed the alliance with England, which was then possible.
At the same time they neglected to seek the support of Russia, which would have
been a logical proceeding. Finally they stumbled into the World War, abandoned
by all except the ill-starred Habsburgs.
Adolf
Hitler
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