Lies being taught;
Mein Kampf is unintelligible ravings of a
maniac.
Now the Truth; Read and know.
VOL 2, CHAPTER IX part 2- FUNDAMENTAL IDEAS
REGARDING THE NATURE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE STORM TROOPS
Part 2 – why the revolution succeeded?
…Setting aside the defects of the old State,
which really became the cause of the Revolution, if we ask how it was possible
to carry the Revolution to a successful issue as a political act, we arrive at
the following conclusions:
l. It was due to a process of dry rot in our
conceptions of duty and obedience.
2. It was due also to the passive timidity of
the Parties who were supposed to uphold the State.
To this the following must be added: The dry
rot which attacked our concepts of duty and obedience was fundamentally due to
our wholly non-national and purely State education. From this came the habit of
confusing means and ends. Consciousness of duty, fulfilment of duty, and obedience,
are not ends in themselves no more than the State is an end in itself; but they
all ought to be employed as means to facilitate and assure the existence of a
community of people who are kindred both physically and spiritually. At a
moment when a nation is manifestly collapsing and when all outward signs show
that it is on the point of becoming the victim of ruthless oppression, thanks
to the conduct of a few miscreants, to obey these people and fulfil one's duty
towards them is merely doctrinaire formalism, and indeed pure folly; whereas,
on the other hand, the refusal of obedience and fulfilment of duty in such a case
might save the nation from collapse. According to our current bourgeois idea of
the State, if a divisional general received from above the order not to shoot
he fulfilled his duty and therefore acted rightly in not shooting, because to
the bourgeois mind blind formal obedience is a more valuable thing than the
life of a nation. But according to the National Socialist concept it is not
obedience to weak superiors that should prevail at such moments, in such an
hour the duty of assuming personal responsibility towards the whole nation
makes its appearance.
The Revolution succeeded because that concept
had ceased to be a vital force with our people, or rather with our governments,
and died down to something that was merely formal and doctrinaire.
As regards the second point, it may be said
that the more profound cause of the fecklessness of the bourgeois parties must
be attributed to the fact that the most active and upright section of our
people had lost their lives in the war. Apart from that, the bourgeois parties,
which may be considered as the only political formations that stood by the old State,
were convinced that they ought to defend their principles only by intellectual
ways and means, since the use of physical force was permitted only to the
State. That outlook was a sign of the weakness and decadence which had been
gradually developing. And it was also senseless at a period when there was a
political adversary who had long ago abandoned that standpoint and, instead of
this, had openly declared that he meant to attain his political ends by force
whenever that became possible. When Marxism emerged in the world of bourgeois
democracy, as a consequence of that democracy itself, the appeal sent out by
the bourgeois democracy to fight Marxism with intellectual weapons was a piece
of folly for which a terrible expiation had to be made later on. For Marxism
always professed the doctrine that the use of arms was a matter which had to be
judged from the standpoint of expediency and that success justified the use of
arms.
This idea was proved correct during the days
from November 7 to 10, 1918. The Marxists did not then bother themselves in the
least about parliament or democracy, but they gave the death blow to both by
turning loose their horde of criminals to shoot and raise hell.
When the Revolution was over the bourgeois
parties changed the title of their firm and suddenly reappeared, the heroic
leaders emerging from dark cellars or more lightsome storehouses where they had
sought refuge. But, just as happens in the case of all representatives of
antiquated institutions, they had not forgotten their errors or learned
anything new. Their political programme was grounded in the past, even though they
themselves had become reconciled to the new regime. Their aim was to secure a
share in the new establishment, and so they continued the use of words as their
sole weapon.
Therefore after the Revolution the bourgeois
parties also capitulated to the street in a miserable fashion.
When the law for the Protection of the
Republic was introduced the majority was not at first in favour of it. But,
confronted with two hundred thousand Marxists demonstrating in the streets, the
bourgeois 'statesmen' were so terror-stricken that they voted for the Law
against their wills, for the edifying reason that otherwise they feared they might
get their heads smashed by the enraged masses on leaving the Reichstag.
And so the new State developed along its own
course, as if there had been no national opposition at all.
The only organizations which at that time had
the strength and courage to face Marxism and its enraged masses were first of
all the volunteer corps (Note 19), and subsequently the organizations for
self-defence, the civic guards and finally the associations formed by the
demobilized soldiers of the old Army.
[Note 19. After the DEBACLE of 1918 several
semi-military associations were formed by demobilized officers who had fought
at the Front. These were semi-clandestine associations and were known as
FREIKORPS (Volunteer corps). Their principal purpose was to act as rallying
centres for the old nationalist elements.]
But the existence of these bodies did not
appreciably change the course of German history; and that for the following
causes:
As the so-called national parties were
without influence, because they had no force which could effectively
demonstrate in the street, the Leagues of Defence could not exercise any
influence because they had no political idea and especially because they had no
definite political aim in view.
The success which Marxism once attained was
due to perfect co-operation between political purposes and ruthless force. What
deprived nationalist Germany of all practical hopes of shaping German
development was the lack of a determined co-operation between brute force and
political aims wisely chosen.
Whatever may have been the aspirations of the
'national' parties, they had no force whatsoever to fight for these
aspirations, least of all in the streets.
The Defence Leagues had force at their
disposal. They were masters of the street and of the State, but they lacked
political ideas and aims on behalf of which their forces might have been or
could have been employed in the interests of the German nation. The cunning Jew
was able in both cases, by his astute powers of persuasion, in reinforcing an
already existing tendency to make this unfortunate state of affairs permanent and
at the same time to drive the roots of it still deeper.
The Jew succeeded brilliantly in using his
Press for the purpose of spreading abroad the idea that the defence
associations were of a 'non-political' character just as in politics he was
always astute enough to praise the purely intellectual character of the
struggle and demand that it must always be kept on that plane
Millions of German imbeciles then repeated
this folly without having the
slightest suspicion that by so doing they
were, for all practical purposes, disarming themselves and delivering
themselves defenceless into the hands of the Jew.
But there is a natural explanation of this
also. The lack of a great idea which would re-shape things anew has always
meant a limitation in fighting power. The conviction of the right to employ
even the most brutal weapons is always associated with an ardent faith in the necessity
for a new and revolutionary transformation of the world.
A movement which does not fight for such high
aims and ideals will never have recourse to extreme means.
The appearance of a new and great idea was
the secret of success in the French Revolution. The Russian Revolution owes its
triumph to an idea. And it was only the idea that enabled Fascism triumphantly
to subject a whole nation to a process of complete renovation.
Bourgeois parties are not capable of such an
achievement. And it was not the bourgeois parties alone that fixed their aim in
a restoration of the past. The defence associations also did so, in so far as
they concerned themselves with political aims at all. The spirit of the old war
legions and Kyffauser tendencies lived in them and therewith helped politically
to blunt the sharpest weapons which the German nation then possessed and allow
them to rust in the hands of republican serfs. The fact that these associations
were inspired by the best of intentions in so doing, and certainly acted in
good faith, does not alter in the slightest degree the foolishness of the course
they adopted.
In the consolidated REICHSWEHR Marxism
gradually acquired the support of force, which it needed for its authority. As
a logical consequence it proceeded to abolish those defence associations which
it considered dangerous, declaring that they were now no longer necessary. Some
rash leaders who defied the Marxist orders were summoned to court and sent to prison.
But they all got what they had deserved.
The founding of the National Socialist German
Labour Party incited a movement which was the first to fix its aim, not in a
mechanical restoration of the past--as the bourgeois parties did--but in the substitution
of an organic People's State for the present absurd statal mechanism.
From the first day of its foundation the new
movement took its stand on the principle that its ideas had to be propagated by
intellectual means but that, wherever necessary, muscular force must be
employed to support this propaganda. In accordance with their conviction of the
paramount importance of the new doctrine, the leaders of the new movement naturally
believe that no sacrifice can be considered too great when it is a question of
carrying through the purpose of the movement.
I have emphasized that in certain
circumstances a movement which is meant to win over the hearts of the people
must be ready to defend itself with its own forces against terrorist attempts
on the part of its adversaries. It has invariably happened in the history of
the world that formal State authority has failed to break a reign of terror
which was inspired by a WELTANSCHAUUNG. It can only be conquered by a new and different
WELTANSCHAUUNG whose representatives are quite as audacious and determined. The
acknowledgment of this fact has always been very unpleasant for the bureaucrats
who are the protectors of the State, but the fact remains nevertheless. The
rulers of the State can guarantee tranquillity and order only in case the State
embodies a WELTANSCHAUUNG which is shared in by the people as a whole; so that
elements of disturbance can be treated as isolated criminals, instead of being considered
as the champions of an idea which is diametrically opposed to official
opinions. If such should be the case the State may employ the most violent
measures for centuries long against the terror that threatens it; but in the
end all these measures will prove futile, and the State will have to succumb.
The German State is intensely overrun by
Marxism. In a struggle that went on for seventy years the State was not able to
prevent the triumph of the Marxist idea. Even though the sentences to penal
servitude and imprisonment amounted in all to thousands of years, and even
though the most sanguinary methods of repression were in innumerable instances threatened
against the champions of the Marxist WELTANSCHAUUNG, in the end the State was
forced to capitulate almost completely. The ordinary bourgeois political
leaders will deny all this, but their protests are futile.
Seeing that the State capitulated
unconditionally to Marxism on November 9th, 1918, it will not suddenly rise up
tomorrow as the conqueror of Marxism. On the contrary. Bourgeois simpletons
sitting on office stools in the various ministries babble about the necessity
of not governing against the wishes of the workers, and by the word 'workers'
they mean the Marxists. By identifying the German worker with Marxism not only
are they guilty of a vile falsification of the truth, but they thus try to hide
their own collapse before the Marxist idea and the Marxist organization.
In view of the complete subordination of the
present State to Marxism, the National Socialist Movement feels all the more
bound not only to prepare the way for the triumph of its idea by appealing to
the reason and understanding of the public but also to take upon itself the responsibility
of organizing its own defence against the terror of the International, which is
intoxicated with its own victory.
I have already described how practical
experience in our young movement led us slowly to organize a system of defence
for our meetings. This gradually assumed the character of a military body
specially trained for the maintenance of order, and tended to develop into a
service which would have its properly organized cadres.
This new formation might resemble the defence
associations externally, but in reality there were no grounds of comparison
between the one and the other.
As I have already said, the German defence
organizations did not have any definite political ideas of their own. They
really were only associations for mutual protection, and they were trained and
organized accordingly, so that they were an illegal complement or auxiliary to
the legal forces of the State. Their character as free corps arose only from the
way in which they were constructed and the situation in which the State found
itself at that time. But they certainly could not claim to be free corps on the
grounds that they were associations formed freely and privately for the purpose
of fighting for their own freely formed political convictions. Such they were
not, despite the fact that some of their leaders and some associations as such
were definitely opposed to the Republic. For before we can speak of political
convictions in the higher sense we must be something more than merely convinced
that the existing regime is defective. Political convictions in the higher
sense mean that one has the picture of a new regime clearly before one's mind, feels
that the establishment of this regime is an absolute necessity and sets himself
to carry out that purpose as the highest task to which his life can be devoted.
The troops for the preservation of order,
which were then formed under the National Socialist Movement, were
fundamentally different from all the other defence associations by reason of
the fact that our formations were not meant in any way to defend the state of
things created by the Revolution, but rather that they were meant exclusively
to support our struggle for the creation of a new Germany.
In the beginning this body was merely a guard
to maintain order at our meetings. Its first task was limited to making it
possible for us to hold our meetings, which otherwise would have been
completely prevented by our opponents. These men were at that time trained
merely for purposes of attack, but they were not taught to adore the big stick exclusively,
as was then pretended in stupid German patriotic circles. They used the cudgel
because they knew that it can be made impossible for high ideals to be put
forward if the man who endeavours to propagate them can be struck down with the
cudgel. As a matter of fact, it has happened in history not infrequently that
some of the greatest minds have perished under the blows of the most
insignificant helots. Our bodyguards did not look upon violence as an end in
itself, but they protected the expositors of ideal aims and purposes against
hostile coercion by violence. They also understood that there was no obligation
to undertake the defence of a State which did not guarantee the defence of the
nation, but that, on the contrary, they had to defend the nation against those
who were threatening to destroy nation and State.
After the fight which took place at the
meeting in the Munich Hofbräuhaus, where the small number of our guards who
were present won everlasting fame for themselves by the heroic manner in which
they stormed the adversaries; these guards were called THE STORM DETACHMENT. As
the name itself indicates, they represent only a DETACHMENT of the Movement.
They are one constituent element of it, just as is the Press, the propaganda,
educational institutes, and other sections of the Party.
We learned how necessary was the formation of
such a body, not only from our experience on the occasion of that memorable
meeting but also when we sought gradually to carry the Movement beyond Munich
and extend it to the other parts of Germany. Once we had begun to appear as a
danger to Marxism the Marxists lost no opportunity of trying to crush
beforehand all preparations for the holding of National Socialist meetings.
When they did not succeed in this they tried to break up the meeting itself. It
goes without saying that all the Marxist organizations, no matter of what grade
or view, blindly supported the policy and activities of their representations
in every case. But what is to be said of the bourgeois parties who, when they
were reduced to silence by these same Marxists and in many places did not dare
to send their speakers to appear before the public, yet showed themselves
pleased, in a stupid and incomprehensible manner, every time we received any
kind of set-back in our fight against Marxism. The bourgeois parties were happy
to think that those whom they themselves could not stand up against, but had to
knuckle down to, could not be broken by us. What must be said of those State
officials, chiefs of police, and even cabinet ministers, who showed a
scandalous lack of principle in presenting themselves externally to the public
as 'national' and yet shamelessly acted as the henchmen of the Marxists in the
disputes which we, National Socialists, had with the latter. What can be said
of persons who debased themselves so far, for the sake of a little abject
praise in the Jewish Press, that they persecuted those men to whose heroic
courage and intervention, regardless of risk, they were partly indebted for not
having been torn to pieces by the Red mob a few years previously and strung up
to the lamp-posts?
One day these lamentable phenomena fired the
late but unforgotten Prefect Pöhner--a man whose unbending straightforwardness forced
him to hate all twisters and to hate them as only a man with an honest heart can
hate--to say: "In all my life I wished to be first a German and then an
official, and I never wanted to mix up with these creatures who, as if they
were kept officials, prostituted themselves before anybody who could play lord
and master for the time being."
It was a specially sad thing that gradually
tens of thousands of honest and loyal servants of the State did not only come
under the power of such people but were also slowly contaminated by their
unprincipled morals. Moreover, these kind of men pursued honest officials with
a furious hatred, degrading them and driving them from their positions, and yet
passed themselves off as 'national' by the aid of their lying hypocrisy.
From officials of that kind we could expect
no support, and only in very rare instances was it given. Only by building up
its own defence could our movement become secure and attract that amount of
public attention and general respect which is given to those who can defend
themselves when attacked.
As an underlying principle in the internal
development of the Storm Detachment, we came to the decision that not only
should it be perfectly trained in bodily efficiency but that the men should be
so instructed as to make them indomitably convinced champions of the National
Socialist ideas and, finally, that they should be schooled to observe the strictest
discipline. This body was to have nothing to do with the defence organizations
of the bourgeois type and especially not with any secret organization.
My reasons at that time for guarding strictly
against letting the Storm Detachment of the German National Socialist Labour
Party appear as a defence association were as follows:
On purely practical grounds it is impossible
to build up a national defence organization by means of private associations,
unless the State makes an enormous contribution to it. Whoever thinks otherwise
overestimates his own powers. Now it is entirely out of the question to form
organizations of any military value for a definite purpose on the principle of
so-called 'voluntary discipline'. Here the chief support for enforcing orders,
namely, the power of inflicting punishment, is lacking. In the autumn, or
rather in the spring, of 1919 it was still possible to raise 'volunteer corps',
not only because most of the men who came forward at that time had been through
the school of the old Army, but also because the kind of duty imposed there
constrained the individual to absolute obedience at least for a definite period
of time.
That spirit is entirely lacking in the
volunteer defence organizations of to-day. The more the defence association
grows, the weaker its discipline becomes and so much the less can one demand
from the individual members. Thus the whole organization will more and more assume
the character of the old non-political associations of war comrades and
veterans.
It is impossible to carry through a voluntary
training in military service for larger masses unless one is assured absolute
power of command. There will always be few men who will voluntarily and spontaneously
submit to that kind of obedience which is considered natural and necessary in
the Army.
Moreover, a proper system of military
training cannot be developed where there are such ridiculously scanty means as
those at the disposal of the defence associations. The principal task of such
an institution must be to impart the best and most reliable kind of
instruction. Eight years have passed since the end of the War, and during that
time none of our German youth, at an age when formerly they would have had to
do military service, have received any systematic training at all. The aim of a
defence association cannot be to enlist here and now all those who have already
received a military training; for in that case it could be reckoned with
mathematical accuracy when the last member would leave the association. Even
the younger soldier from 1918 will no longer be fit for front-line service
twenty years later, and we are approaching that state of things with a rapidity
that gives cause for anxiety. Thus the defence associations must assume more
and more the aspect of the old ex-service men's societies. But that cannot be
the meaning and purpose of an institution which calls itself, not an
association of ex-service men but a DEFENCE association, indicating by this
title that it considers its task to be, not only to preserve the tradition of
the old soldiers and hold them together but also to propagate the idea of national
defence and be able to carry this idea into practical effect, which means the
creation of a body of men who are fit and trained for military defence.
But this implies that those elements will
receive a military training which up to now have received none. This is
something that in practice is impossible for the defence associations. Real
soldiers cannot be made by a training of one or two hours per week. In view of
the enormously increasing demands which modern warfare imposes on each
individual soldier to-day, a military service of two years is barely sufficient
to transform a raw recruit into a trained soldier. At the Front during the War
we all saw the fearful consequences which our young recruits had to suffer from
their lack of a thorough military training. Volunteer formations which had been
drilled for fifteen or twenty weeks under an iron discipline and shown
unlimited self-denial proved nevertheless to be no better than cannon fodder at
the Front. Only when distributed among the ranks of the old and experienced
soldiers could the young recruits, who had been trained for four or six months,
become useful members of a regiment. Guided by the 'old men', they adapted
themselves gradually to their task.
In the light of all this, how hopeless must
the attempt be to create a body of fighting troops by a so-called training of
one or two hours in the week, without any definite power of command and without
any considerable means. In that way perhaps one could refresh military training
in old soldiers, but raw recruits cannot thus be transformed into expert
soldiers.
How such a proceeding produces utterly
worthless results may also be demonstrated by the fact that at the same time as
these so-called volunteer defence associations, with great effort and outcry
and under difficulties and lack of necessities, try to educate and train a few thousand
men of goodwill (the others need not be taken into account) for purposes of
national defence, the State teaches our young men democratic and pacifist ideas
and thus deprives millions and millions of their national instincts, poisons
their logical sense of patriotism and gradually turns them into a herd of sheep
who will patiently follow any arbitrary command. Thus they render ridiculous
all those attempts made by the defence associations to inculcate their ideas in
the minds of the German youth.
Almost more important is the following
consideration, which has always made me take up a stand against all attempts at
a so-called military training on the basis of the volunteer associations.
Assuming that, in spite of all the
difficulties just mentioned, a defence association were successful in training
a certain number of Germans every year to be efficient soldiers, not only as regards
their mental outlook but also as regards bodily efficiency and the expert handling
of arms, the result must necessarily be null and void in a State whose whole
tendency makes it not only look upon such a defensive formation as undesirable
but even positively hate it, because such an association would completely
contradict the intimate aims of the political leaders, who are the corrupters
of this State.
But anyhow, such a result would be worthless
under governments which have demonstrated by their own acts that they do not
lay the slightest importance on the military power of the nation and are not
disposed to permit an appeal to that power only in case that it were necessary
for the protection of their own malignant existence.
And that is the state of affairs to-day. It
is not ridiculous to think of training some ten thousand men in the use of
arms, and carry on that training surreptitiously, when a few years previously
the State, having shamefully sacrificed eight-and-a-half million highly trained
soldiers, not merely did not require their services any more, but, as a mark of
gratitude for their sacrifices, held them up to public contemptuously. Shall we
train soldiers for a regime which besmirched and spat upon our most glorious
soldiers, tore the medals and badges from their breasts, trampled on their
flags and derided their achievements? Has the present regime taken one step
towards restoring the honour of the old army and bringing those who destroyed
and outraged it to answer for their deeds? Not in the least. On the contrary,
the people I have just referred to may be seen enthroned in the highest
positions under the State to-day. And yet it was said at Leipzig: "Right
goes with might." Since, however, in our Republic to-day might is in the
hands of the very men who arranged for the Revolution, and since that
Revolution represents a most despicable act of high treason against the
nation--yea, the vilest act in German history--there can surely be no grounds
for saying that might of this character should be enhanced by the formation of
a new young army. It is against all sound reason.
The importance which this State attached,
after the Revolution of 1918, to the reinforcement of its position from the
military point of view is clearly and unmistakably demonstrated by its attitude
towards the large self-defence organizations which existed in that period. They
were not unwelcome as long as they were of use for the personal protection of
the miserable creatures cast up by the Revolution.
But the danger to these creatures seemed to
disappear as the debasement of our people gradually increased. As the existence
of the defence associations no longer implied a reinforcement of the national
policy they became superfluous. Hence every effort was made to disarm them and suppress
them wherever that was possible.
History records only a few examples of
gratitude on the part of princes. But there is not one patriot among the new
bourgeoisie who can count on the gratitude of revolutionary incendiaries and
assassins, persons who have enriched themselves from the public spoil and
betrayed the nation. In examining the problem as to the wisdom of forming these
defence associations I have never ceased to ask: 'For whom shall I train these young
men? For what purpose will they be employed when they will have to be called
out?' The answer to these questions lays down at the same time the best rule
for us to follow.
If the present State should one day have to
call upon trained troops of this kind it would never be for the purpose of
defending the interests of the nation VIS-À-VIS those of the stranger but
rather to protect the oppressors of the nation inside the country against the
danger of a general outbreak of wrath on the part of a nation which has been deceived
and betrayed and whose interests have been bartered away.
For this reason it was decided that the Storm
Detachment of the German National Socialist Labour Party ought not to be in the
nature of a military organization. It had to be an instrument of protection and
education for the National Socialist Movement and its duties should be in quite
a different sphere from that of the military defence association. …
Adolf Hitler
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