New Age History and Economics

The Day We See The Truth And Cease To Speak it, Is The Day We Begin To Die. MLK Jr.

Saturday, April 1, 2017

Turning Points for Hitler in World War 2?

Lies being Taught;
Loss at Battle for Stalingrad was the turning point for Hitler in World war 2  

Now the truth;
In my opinion no one nation can win a war fighting combined strength of 121 Nations and without using weapons of mass destruction. The primary purpose of History is to know the past to understand the present and plan the future.

While this posting may not be politically correct and does not comport with the myths and legends of your text, it is historically accurate - as you will discover if you give even minimal examination to the record.

Two years into the world war 2, in September 1941, German arms seemed to be carrying all before them. Western Europe had been decisively conquered, and there were few signs of any serious resistance to German rule. The failure of the Italians to establish Mussolini's much-vaunted new Roman empire in the Mediterranean had been made good by German intervention. German forces had overrun Greece, and subjugated Yugoslavia. In north Africa, Rommel's brilliant generalship was pushing the British and allied forces eastwards towards Egypt and threatening the Suez canal. Above all, the invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 had reaped stunning rewards, with Leningrad (the present-day St Petersburg) besieged by German and Finnish troops, Smolensk and Kiev taken, and millions of Red Army troops killed or captured in a series of vast encircling operations that brought the German armed forces within reach of Moscow. Surrounded by a girdle of allies, from Vichy France and Finland to Romania and Hungary, and with the more or less benevolent neutrality of countries such as Sweden and Switzerland posing no serious threat, the Greater German Reich seemed to be unstoppable in its drive for supremacy in Europe.

Yet in retrospect this proved to be the high point of German success. The fundamental problem facing Hitler was that Germany simply did not have the resources to fight on so many different fronts at the same time.

Firstly Hitler did not want war. He did not build strategic bombers. Hitler only had two-engine Dorniers and Heinkels that could not even reach Britain from Germany? He offered the British peace, twice, first after Poland fell, and again after France fell? His allowing British expeditionary force to be evacuated and did not press his victory was the first turning point in World war 2.

The second turning point was Hitler's failure to achieve the alliance he desired with the British, even after he halted his tanks and allowed the British Expeditionary force to be evacuated from Dunkirk. To his last days he believed that the UK would come to understand that Stalin and the Communists were a common enemy and threat and an Anglo-German alliance would be in the best interests of not only both Empires, but of Europe generally.

Thirdly Hitler did not demand the French fleet after fall of France, as the Allies demanded and got the Kaiser’s fleet? He did not demand bases in French-controlled Syria to attack Suez? Rather he practically begged Benito Mussolini not to attack Greece?

Turning point 4 would be Hitler's failure to convince the Japanese to open a front against Stalin in Manchuko. Japan had tried that in 1938/39 and they weren't about to repeat that stupid mistake.

Turning 5 would be helping inept Italy. North Africa was the Italian Theater of Operations. The Germans had no real plans there The Afrika Korps was a quickly thrown together outfit that was never properly equipped or supported or reainforced. Its mission was to help the Italians and to defend their positions. Rommel and Hitler both agreed that southern Italy was of little strategic or tactical importance.

Turning point number 5 was the failure to convince Japan to focus on western Indian Ocean, especially after Tojo decided to concentrate on the Pacific and Eastern Indian Ocean, rather than on the Western Indian Ocean and India, Hitler's desire for an Axis Suez Canal with Italy and Germany holding the north end and Japan the south came to naught.

The real turning point 6 was his failure to understand power of Jewish financial control. He failed to understand and deal with Jewish influence not only to prevent any understanding with England but their cunning to plan and execute false flags to rope in USA into World War 2

The turning point 7 would be his diplomatic failures (primarily due to point no 6). Militarily, the outcome of the war was all but inevitable. Hitler knew that if he didn't attack the USSR, Stalin was apt to attack him. Better to fight an offensive war on the Volga and Don than a defensive one on the Oder. There is substantial reliable evidence that Stalin would have attacked by the Spring of '42, if not earlier. The OKW had grossly underestimated the quality and quantity of Soviet weapons. the will and ability of the Red Army to fight, Soviet resolve and the Soviet industrial/manufacturing base. Be that as it may, Barbarossa was initiated at about the most opportune time, although Italian ineptitude in the Balkans did force a delay of several crucial weeks while invasion forces were diverted to help bail Mussolini out, especially in Yugoslavia and Greece. In the long run, that delay critically altered the final outcome.

Early successes caused the OKW to lose sight of the fact that Blitzkreig was designed to take large expanses of territory by massive surprise attacks across an extended front, but not to hold or occupy the conquered territory. Stalin knew better. He knew he could not hold the indefensible terrain of Eastern Europe and Western Russia so he ordered a fighting retreat, at tremendous cost in men, territory and materiel, while he moved his factories behind the safety of the Urals and got them into full production, while at the same time he prepared the bastions at which he intended to make his stand and from which he planned to launch his counteroffensive: places like Moscow, Stalingrad and Leningrad. Operation Barbarossa pretty much failed to attain a single one of its objectives.

By the time the US finally entered the shooting war in November 1942, against the Vichy French in North Africa, the Red Army had annihilated Army Group Central at Moscow. The Russian Winter did not determine the fate of the Heer Army there; the Red Army and logistics did. When El Alamein II was contested, the Red Army had stopped the advance at Stalingrad and Leningrad. By the time the Western Allies landed in Italy, the Red Army had destroyed Army Group South and was getting ready to push Army Group North into the Courland Pocket, where it would be removed from the war. The end was written when Stalin launched Operations Jupiter, Uranus and Mars. Mars failed, due largely to the winter weather. The winter was the greatest German ally in that one. However, even in failure, Mars forced the OKW to redeploy hundreds of thousands of troops and to yet again revise war plans. In failure, Mars was actually a strategic victory for the Soviets in the long run. If the end wasn't written at Moscow, Stalingrad or Leningrad, it certainly was at Kursk and Smolensk. However, the war in the East, the real war in Europe, was a war of attrition. The Germans had no chance even from the beginning in a war of attrition because of the huge and insurmountable advantages the Soviets held in manpower and resources.

As so correctly points out, the real war was the war between Germany and the USSR. There was very little significant military contribution to the Fall of the Third Reich by the US/UK and combined Western Allies, and there were no real or critical "turning points" to the actual war in Europe that occurred in the west (or in Italy or Africa). Those fronts were secondary and insignificant in the overall scheme of the war.

The Battle of Britain was insignificant. It was a diversion more than anything, designed to keep Stalin of balance and believing the Germans weren't going to move east. It was also necessary to protect the Western flank from a landing by UK and allied troops in France. It had taken only six weeks to crush the combined French and UK forces in 1940, but once the real war got underway in the east, Hitler didn't want the inconvenience of having to do it again.

He had never planned to invade the British Isles. Yes, plans for Operation Sealion (the invasion of the British Isles) had been prepared. One makes contingency plans in time of war, whether or not one plans to implement them. The US continued to revise the Rainbow Five, but no one in Washington ever seriously considered invading Great Britain, Ireland, Canada, India or Australia. And plans for Operation Downfall (for the invasion of the Japanese home islands) had been prepared, but by March 1945, very few in the War Department or at the front really believed the invasion would ever be necessary (and neither were the bombs at Nagasaki or Hiroshima, as Nimitz, Eisenhower, MacArthur, Spaatz (commander of Air Forces in the Far East) Chief of Staff Leahy and a host of others all agreed when they recommended against using the heinous weapons, and as the US Strategic Bombing Survey concluded immediately after the war).

Even had the Luftwaffe gained air superiority, the Kriegsmarine was no match for the Royal Navy and Hitler knew it. Any attempt at an amphibious invasion would have been sent to the bottom of the Channel before it reached the beaches (and an airborne invasion would have been an untenable fools mission without amphibious support). For proof that the Germans had no intention to invade the British Isles, one need look no farther than German landing craft. Without LC's, invasion was impossible. The Germans had none. They had none in production. They had no plans to produce any. They had no plans to land troops in England (or Scotland or Wales or Ireland). The Battle of Britain was called off, as had always been the plan, when Barbarossa was launched and the Luftwaffe was sent east to support the Heer Army in the real war.

The seventh and final turning point was refusal of Hitler to produce or use Atomic or nuclear weapons. He banned them. Hitler, who had read an article of Heisenberg, said:" The effects would be terrible.. All kind of life, not only human life but also life of animals and plants would be exterminated for hundreds of years within a radius of 40 Kilometers ...... No nation; no group of civilized humans beings could consciously bear such responsibility. From strikes and counter strikes the human species would exterminate itself"

Unlike England or USA, Hitler never wanted world domination. Hitler's primary goals, as he made clear from Mein Kampf on, was 1) simply a plebiscite to allow people to rejoin Germany which had been cut in pieces in 1919 and 2) To rid the world of Communism and Communists. Hitler never wanted war.

“I believe now that Hitler and the German People did not want war.
BUT WE, {England}, DECLARED WAR ON GERMANY, INTENT ON DESTROYING IT, in accordance with our principle of Balance of Power, and we were encouraged by the 'Americans'{Jews} around Roosevelt. We ignored Hitler's pleading, not to enter into war. Now we are forced to realize
that Hitler was right. He offered us the co-operation of Germany: instead, since 1945, we have been facing the immense power of the Soviet Empire. I feel ashamed and humiliated to see that the aims we accused Hitler of, are being relentlessly pursued now, only under a different label."
(The British Attorney General Sir Hartle Shawcross, said in a speech at
Stourbridge, March 16, 1984 (AP)).

Kapel De

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