New Age History and Economics

The Day We See The Truth And Cease To Speak it, Is The Day We Begin To Die. MLK Jr.

Sunday, April 16, 2017

Mein Kampf Beginnings of National Socialism CH xiid.

Lies being taught;
Mein Kampf is unintelligible ravings of a maniac.
Now the Truth; Read and know. CHAPTER XIId- Beginnings of our movement.

“During the initial phase of our movement, our greatest handicap was the fact that none of us were known and our names meant nothing, a fact which then seemed to some of us to make the chances of final success problematical.

Consider that only six or seven poor devils who were entirely unknown came together to found a movement which should succeed in doing what the great mass-parties had failed to do: namely, to reconstruct the German REICH, even in greater power and glory than before. We should have been very pleased if we were attacked or even ridiculed. But the most depressing fact was that nobody paid any attention to us whatever. This utter lack of interest in us caused me great mental pain at that time. In Munich nobody knew of the existence of such a party, not even by name, except our few members and their small circle of acquaintances.

Every Wednesday what was called a committee meeting was held in one of the cafés, and a debate was arranged for one evening each week. In the beginning all the members of the movement were also members of the committee, therefore the same persons always turned up at both meetings. The first step that had to be taken was to extend the narrow limits of this small circle and get new members, but the principal necessity was to utilize all the means at our command for the purpose of making the movement known.  We chose the following methods: We decided to hold a monthly meeting to which the public would be invited. Some of the invitations were typewritten, and some were written by hand. For the first few meetings we distributed them in the streets and delivered them personally at certain houses. Each one canvassed among his own acquaintances and tried to persuade some of them to attend our meetings. The result was lamentable.

We then changed our methods. We had the invitations written with a typewriter in a Munich stationer's shop and then multigraphed them.

The result was that a few more people attended our next meeting. The number increased gradually from eleven to thirteen to seventeen, to twenty-three and finally to thirty-four. We collected some money within our own circle, each poor devil giving a small contribution, and in that way we raised sufficient funds to be able to advertise one of our meetings in the MUNICH OBSERVER, which was still an independent paper.

This time we had an astonishing success. We had chosen the Munich HOFBRÄU HAUS KELLER (which must not be confounded with the Munich HOFBRÄU HAUS FESTSAAL) as our meeting-place. It was a small hall and would accommodate scarcely more than 130 people. To me, however, the hall seemed enormous, and we were all trembling lest this tremendous edifice would remain partly empty on the night of the meeting.

At seven o'clock 111 persons were present, and the meeting was opened. A Munich professor delivered the principal address, and I spoke after him. That was my first appearance in the role of public orator. The whole thing seemed a very daring adventure to Herr Harrer, who was then chairman of the party. He was a very decent fellow; but he had an A PRIORI conviction that, although I might have quite a number of good qualities, I certainly did not have a talent for public speaking. Even later he could not be persuaded to change his opinion. But he was mistaken. Twenty minutes had been allotted to me for my speech on this occasion, which might be looked upon as our first public meeting.

I talked for thirty minutes, and what I always had felt deep down in my heart, without being able to put it to the test, was here proved to be true: I could make a good speech. At the end of the thirty minutes it was quite clear that all the people in the little hall had been profoundly impressed. The enthusiasm aroused among them found its first expression in the fact that my appeal to those present brought us donations which amounted to three hundred marks. That was a great relief for us. Our finances were at that time so meager that we could not afford to have our party prospectus printed, or even leaflets. Now we possessed at least the nucleus of a fund from which we could pay the most urgent and necessary expenses.

The need for this fresh blood supply became evident to me after a few weeks of collaboration with the new members. Herr Harrer, who was then chairman of the party, was a journalist by profession, and as such he was a man of general knowledge. But as leader of the party he had one very serious handicap: he could not speak to the crowd. Though he did his work conscientiously, it lacked the necessary driving force, probably for the reason that he had no oratorical gifts whatsoever. Herr Drexler, at that time chairman of the Munich local group, was a simple working man. He, too, was not of any great importance as a speaker. Moreover, he was not a soldier. He had never done military service, even during the War. So that this man who was feeble and diffident by nature had missed the only school which knows how to transform diffident and weakly natures into real men. Therefore neither of those two men were of the stuff that would have enabled them to stir up an ardent and indomitable faith in the ultimate triumph of the movement and to brush aside, with obstinate force and if necessary with brutal ruthlessness, all obstacles that stood in the path of the new idea. Such a task could be carried out only by men who had been trained, body and soul, in those military virtues which make a man, so to speak, agile as a greyhound, tough as leather, and hard as Krupp steel.

At that time I was still a soldier. Physically and mentally I had the polish of six years of service, so that in the beginning this circle must have looked on me as quite a stranger. In common with my army comrades, I had forgotten such phrases as: "That will not go", or "That is not possible", or "We ought not to take such a risk; it is too dangerous".

The whole undertaking was of its very nature dangerous. At that time there were many parts of Germany where it would have been absolutely impossible openly to invite people to a national meeting that dared to make a direct appeal to the masses. Those who attended such meetings were usually dispersed and driven away with broken heads. The largest so-called bourgeois mass meetings were accustomed to dissolve, and those in attendance would run away like rabbits when frightened by a dog as soon as a dozen communists appeared on the scene.

The Marxist leaders, whose business consisted in deceiving and misleading the public, naturally hated most of all a movement whose declared aim was to win over those masses which hitherto had been exclusively at the service of international Marxism in the Jewish and Stock Exchange parties. The title alone, 'German Labour party', irritated them. It could easily be foreseen that at the first opportune moment we should have to face the opposition of the Marxist despots, who were still intoxicated with their triumph in 1918.

People in the small circles of our own movement at that time showed a certain amount of anxiety at the prospect of such a conflict. They wanted to refrain as much as possible from coming out into the open, because they feared that they might be attacked and beaten. I found it difficult to defend my own position, which was that the conflict should not be evaded but that it should be faced openly and that we should be armed with those weapons which are the only protection against brute force. Terror cannot be overcome by the weapons of the mind but only by counter-terror.

Some time in October 1919 the second larger meeting took place in the EBERLBRÄU KELLER. The theme of our speeches was 'Brest-Litowsk and Versailles'. There were four speakers. I talked for almost an hour, and the success was even more striking than at our first meeting. The number of people who attended had grown to more than 130. An attempt to disturb the proceedings was immediately frustrated by my comrades. The would-be disturbers were thrown down the stairs, bearing imprints of violence on their heads.

A fortnight later another meeting took place in the same hall. The number in attendance had now increased to more than 170, which meant that the room was fairly well filled. I spoke again, and once more the success obtained was greater than at the previous meeting.

Then I proposed that a larger hall should be found. After looking around for some time we discovered one at the other end of the town, in the 'Deutschen REICH' in the Dachauer Strasse. The first meeting at this new rendezvous had a smaller attendance than the previous meeting. There were just less than 140 present. The members of the committee began to be discouraged, and those who had always been skeptical were now convinced that this falling-off in the attendance was due to the fact that we were holding the meetings at too short intervals. There were lively discussions, in which I upheld my own opinion that a city with 700,000 inhabitants ought to be able not only to stand one meeting every fortnight but ten meetings every week. I held that we should not be discouraged by one comparative setback, that the tactics we had chosen were correct, and that sooner or later success would be ours if we only continued with determined perseverance to push forward on our road. This whole winter of 1919-20 was one continual struggle to strengthen confidence in our ability to carry the movement through to success and to intensify this confidence until it became a burning faith that could move mountains.

Our next meeting in the small hall proved the truth of my contention. Our audience had increased to more than 200. The publicity effect and the financial success were splendid. I immediately urged that a further meeting should be held. It took place in less than a fortnight, and there were more than 270 people present. Two weeks later we invited our followers and their friends, for the seventh time, to attend our meeting. The same hall was scarcely large enough for the number that came. They amounted to more than four hundred.

During this phase the young movement developed its inner form. From various sides objections were made against the idea of calling the young movement a party. At that time it was very difficult to make the people understand that every movement is a party as long as it has not brought its ideals to final triumph and thus achieved its purpose. It is a party even if it give itself a thousand different names.

Any person who tries to carry into practice an original idea whose realization would be for the benefit of his fellow men will first have to look for disciples who are ready to fight for the ends he has in view. It is only hair-splitting and playing with words when these antiquated theorists, whose practical success is in reverse ratio to their wisdom, presume to think they can change the character of a movement by merely changing its name.

If somebody has fought for forty years to carry into effect what he calls an idea, and if these alleged efforts not only show no positive results but have not even been able to hinder the success of the opposing party, then the story of those forty years of futile effort furnishes sufficient proof for the incompetence of such a protagonist. Nobody of common sense would appoint to a leading post in such a movement some Teutonic Methuselah who had been ineffectively preaching some idea for a period of forty years, until himself and his idea had entered the stage of senile decay.

Furthermore, only a very small percentage of such people join a new movement with the intention of serving its end unselfishly and helping in the spread of its principles. In most cases they come because they think that, under the aegis of the new movement, it will be possible for them to promulgate their old ideas to the misfortune of their new listeners.

We had declared one of our principles thus: "We shall meet violence with violence in our own defence". Naturally that principle disturbed the equanimity of the knights of the pen. They reproached us bitterly not only for what they called our crude worship of the cudgel but also because, according to them, we had no intellectual forces on our side. These charlatans did not think for a moment that a Demosthenes could be reduced to silence at a mass-meeting by fifty idiots who had come there to shout him down and use their fists against his supporters. The innate cowardice of the pen-and-ink charlatan prevents him from exposing himself to such a danger, for he always works in safe retirement and never dares to make a noise or come forward in public.

Even to-day I must warn the members of our young movement in the strongest possible terms to guard against the danger of falling into the snare of those who call themselves 'silent workers'. These 'silent workers' are not only a white livered lot but are also, and always will be, ignorant do-nothings. A man who is aware of certain happenings and knows that a certain danger threatens, and at the same time sees a certain remedy which can be employed against it, is in duty bound not to work in silence but to come into the open and publicly fight for the destruction of the evil and the acceptance of his own remedy. If he does not do so, then he is neglecting his duty and shows that he is weak in character and that he fails to act either because of his timidity, or indolence or incompetence. To put it briefly, they are sheer swindlers, political jobbers who feel chagrined by the honest work which others are doing. In addition to all this one ought to note the arrogance and conceited impudence with which these obscurantist idlers try to tear to pieces the work of other people, criticizing it with an air of superiority, and thus playing into the hands of the mortal enemy of our people.

In the beginning of 1920 I put forward the idea of holding our first mass meeting. On this proposal there were differences of opinion amongst us. Some leading members of our party thought that the time was not ripe for such a meeting and that the result might be detrimental. The Press of the Left had begun to take notice of us and we were lucky enough in being able gradually to arouse their wrath. We had begun to appear at other meetings and to ask questions or contradict the speakers, with the natural result that we were shouted down forthwith. But still we thereby gained some of our ends. People began to know of our existence and the better they understood us, the stronger became their aversion and their enmity. Therefore we might expect that a large contingent of our friends from the Red Camp would attend our first mass meeting.

Herr Harrer was then chairman of our party. He did not see eye to eye with me as to the opportune time for our first mass meeting. Accordingly he felt himself obliged to resign from the leadership of the movement, as an upright and honest man. Herr Anton Drexler took his place. I kept the work of organizing the propaganda in my own hands and I listened to no compromise in carrying it out. We decided on February 24th 1920 as the date for the first great popular meeting to be held under the aegis of this movement which was hitherto unknown.

I made all the preparatory arrangements personally. The posters and leaflets concentrated on a few points which were repeated again and again. The text was concise and definite, an absolutely dogmatic form of expression being used. For our principal colour we chose red, as it has an exciting effect on the eye and was therefore calculated to arouse the attention of our opponents and irritate them. Thus they would have to take notice of us--whether they liked it or not--and would not forget us.

In the second volume of this book I shall give a detailed account of the guiding principles which we then followed in drawing up our programme. Here I will only say that the programme was arranged not merely to set forth the form and content of the young movement but also with an eye to making it understood among the broad masses. The so-called intellectual circles made jokes and sneered at it and then tried to criticize it. But the effect of our programme proved that the ideas which we then held were right.

I shall bring the first part of this book to a close by referring to our first great mass meeting, because that meeting marked the occasion on which our framework as a small party had to be broken up and we started to become the most powerful factor of this epoch in the influence we exercised on public opinion. At that time my chief anxiety was that we might not fill the hall and that we might have to face empty benches. I myself was firmly convinced that if only the people would come this day would turn out a great success for the young movement. That was my feeling as I waited impatiently for the hour to come.

It had been announced that the meeting would begin at 7.30. A quarter-of-an-hour before the opening time I walked through the chief hall of the Hofbräuhaus on the PLATZ in Munich and my heart was nearly bursting with joy. The great hall--for at that time it seemed very big to me--was filled to overflowing. Nearly 2,000 people were present. And, above all, those people had come whom we had always wished to reach. More than half the audience consisted of persons who seemed to be communists or independents. Our first great demonstration was destined, in their view, to come to an abrupt end.

But things happened otherwise. When the first speaker had finished I got up to speak. After a few minutes I was met with a hailstorm of interruptions and violent encounters broke out in the body of the hall. A handful of my loyal war comrades and some other followers grappled with the disturbers and restored order in a little while. I was able to continue my speech. After half an hour the applause began to drown the interruptions and the hootings. Then interruptions gradually ceased and applause took their place. When I finally came to explain the twenty-five points and laid them, point after point, before the masses gathered there and asked them to pass their own judgment on each point, one point after another was accepted with increasing enthusiasm. When the last point was reached I had before me a hall full of people united by a new conviction, a new faith and a new will.

Nearly four hours had passed when the hall began to clear. As the masses streamed towards the exits, crammed shoulder to shoulder, shoving and pushing, I knew that a movement was now set afoot among the German people which would never pass into oblivion.

A fire was enkindled from whose glowing heat the sword would be fashioned which would restore freedom to the German Siegfried and bring back life to the German nation.

Beside the revival which I then foresaw, I also felt that the Goddess of Vengeance was now getting ready to redress the treason of the 9th of November, 1918. The hall was emptied. The movement was on the march.”

Adolf Hitler
Kaps

Saturday, April 1, 2017

Turning Points for Hitler in World War 2?


Lies being Taught;
Loss at Battle for Stalingrad was the turning point for Hitler in World war 2  

Now the truth;
In my opinion no one nation can win a war fighting combined strength of 121 Nations and without using weapons of mass destruction. The primary purpose of History is to know the past to understand the present and plan the future.

While this posting may not be politically correct and does not comport with the myths and legends of your text, it is historically accurate - as you will discover if you give even minimal examination to the record.

Two years into the world war 2, in September 1941, German arms seemed to be carrying all before them. Western Europe had been decisively conquered, and there were few signs of any serious resistance to German rule. The failure of the Italians to establish Mussolini's much-vaunted new Roman empire in the Mediterranean had been made good by German intervention. German forces had overrun Greece, and subjugated Yugoslavia. In north Africa, Rommel's brilliant generalship was pushing the British and allied forces eastwards towards Egypt and threatening the Suez canal. Above all, the invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 had reaped stunning rewards, with Leningrad (the present-day St Petersburg) besieged by German and Finnish troops, Smolensk and Kiev taken, and millions of Red Army troops killed or captured in a series of vast encircling operations that brought the German armed forces within reach of Moscow. Surrounded by a girdle of allies, from Vichy France and Finland to Romania and Hungary, and with the more or less benevolent neutrality of countries such as Sweden and Switzerland posing no serious threat, the Greater German Reich seemed to be unstoppable in its drive for supremacy in Europe.

Yet in retrospect this proved to be the high point of German success. The fundamental problem facing Hitler was that Germany simply did not have the resources to fight on so many different fronts at the same time.

Firstly Hitler did not want war. He did not build strategic bombers. Hitler only had two-engine Dorniers and Heinkels that could not even reach Britain from Germany? He offered the British peace, twice, first after Poland fell, and again after France fell? His allowing British expeditionary force to be evacuated and did not press his victory was the first turning point in World war 2.

The second turning point was Hitler's failure to achieve the alliance he desired with the British, even after he halted his tanks and allowed the British Expeditionary force to be evacuated from Dunkirk. To his last days he believed that the UK would come to understand that Stalin and the Communists were a common enemy and threat and an Anglo-German alliance would be in the best interests of not only both Empires, but of Europe generally.

Thirdly Hitler did not demand the French fleet after fall of France, as the Allies demanded and got the Kaiser’s fleet? He did not demand bases in French-controlled Syria to attack Suez? Rather he practically begged Benito Mussolini not to attack Greece?

Turning point 4 would be Hitler's failure to convince the Japanese to open a front against Stalin in Manchuko. Japan had tried that in 1938/39 and they weren't about to repeat that stupid mistake.

Turning 5 would be helping inept Italy. North Africa was the Italian Theater of Operations. The Germans had no real plans there The Afrika Korps was a quickly thrown together outfit that was never properly equipped or supported or reainforced. Its mission was to help the Italians and to defend their positions. Rommel and Hitler both agreed that southern Italy was of little strategic or tactical importance.

Turning point number 5 was the failure to convince Japan to focus on western Indian Ocean, especially after Tojo decided to concentrate on the Pacific and Eastern Indian Ocean, rather than on the Western Indian Ocean and India, Hitler's desire for an Axis Suez Canal with Italy and Germany holding the north end and Japan the south came to naught.

The real turning point 6 was his failure to understand power of Jewish financial control. He failed to understand and deal with Jewish influence not only to prevent any understanding with England but their cunning to plan and execute false flags to rope in USA into World War 2

The turning point 7 would be his diplomatic failures (primarily due to point no 6). Militarily, the outcome of the war was all but inevitable. Hitler knew that if he didn't attack the USSR, Stalin was apt to attack him. Better to fight an offensive war on the Volga and Don than a defensive one on the Oder. There is substantial reliable evidence that Stalin would have attacked by the Spring of '42, if not earlier. The OKW had grossly underestimated the quality and quantity of Soviet weapons. the will and ability of the Red Army to fight, Soviet resolve and the Soviet industrial/manufacturing base. Be that as it may, Barbarossa was initiated at about the most opportune time, although Italian ineptitude in the Balkans did force a delay of several crucial weeks while invasion forces were diverted to help bail Mussolini out, especially in Yugoslavia and Greece. In the long run, that delay critically altered the final outcome.

Early successes caused the OKW to lose sight of the fact that Blitzkreig was designed to take large expanses of territory by massive surprise attacks across an extended front, but not to hold or occupy the conquered territory. Stalin knew better. He knew he could not hold the indefensible terrain of Eastern Europe and Western Russia so he ordered a fighting retreat, at tremendous cost in men, territory and materiel, while he moved his factories behind the safety of the Urals and got them into full production, while at the same time he prepared the bastions at which he intended to make his stand and from which he planned to launch his counteroffensive: places like Moscow, Stalingrad and Leningrad. Operation Barbarossa pretty much failed to attain a single one of its objectives.

By the time the US finally entered the shooting war in November 1942, against the Vichy French in North Africa, the Red Army had annihilated Army Group Central at Moscow. The Russian Winter did not determine the fate of the Heer Army there; the Red Army and logistics did. When El Alamein II was contested, the Red Army had stopped the advance at Stalingrad and Leningrad. By the time the Western Allies landed in Italy, the Red Army had destroyed Army Group South and was getting ready to push Army Group North into the Courland Pocket, where it would be removed from the war. The end was written when Stalin launched Operations Jupiter, Uranus and Mars. Mars failed, due largely to the winter weather. The winter was the greatest German ally in that one. However, even in failure, Mars forced the OKW to redeploy hundreds of thousands of troops and to yet again revise war plans. In failure, Mars was actually a strategic victory for the Soviets in the long run. If the end wasn't written at Moscow, Stalingrad or Leningrad, it certainly was at Kursk and Smolensk. However, the war in the East, the real war in Europe, was a war of attrition. The Germans had no chance even from the beginning in a war of attrition because of the huge and insurmountable advantages the Soviets held in manpower and resources.

As so correctly points out, the real war was the war between Germany and the USSR. There was very little significant military contribution to the Fall of the Third Reich by the US/UK and combined Western Allies, and there were no real or critical "turning points" to the actual war in Europe that occurred in the west (or in Italy or Africa). Those fronts were secondary and insignificant in the overall scheme of the war.

The Battle of Britain was insignificant. It was a diversion more than anything, designed to keep Stalin of balance and believing the Germans weren't going to move east. It was also necessary to protect the Western flank from a landing by UK and allied troops in France. It had taken only six weeks to crush the combined French and UK forces in 1940, but once the real war got underway in the east, Hitler didn't want the inconvenience of having to do it again.

He had never planned to invade the British Isles. Yes, plans for Operation Sealion (the invasion of the British Isles) had been prepared. One makes contingency plans in time of war, whether or not one plans to implement them. The US continued to revise the Rainbow Five, but no one in Washington ever seriously considered invading Great Britain, Ireland, Canada, India or Australia. And plans for Operation Downfall (for the invasion of the Japanese home islands) had been prepared, but by March 1945, very few in the War Department or at the front really believed the invasion would ever be necessary (and neither were the bombs at Nagasaki or Hiroshima, as Nimitz, Eisenhower, MacArthur, Spaatz (commander of Air Forces in the Far East) Chief of Staff Leahy and a host of others all agreed when they recommended against using the heinous weapons, and as the US Strategic Bombing Survey concluded immediately after the war).

Even had the Luftwaffe gained air superiority, the Kriegsmarine was no match for the Royal Navy and Hitler knew it. Any attempt at an amphibious invasion would have been sent to the bottom of the Channel before it reached the beaches (and an airborne invasion would have been an untenable fools mission without amphibious support). For proof that the Germans had no intention to invade the British Isles, one need look no farther than German landing craft. Without LC's, invasion was impossible. The Germans had none. They had none in production. They had no plans to produce any. They had no plans to land troops in England (or Scotland or Wales or Ireland). The Battle of Britain was called off, as had always been the plan, when Barbarossa was launched and the Luftwaffe was sent east to support the Heer Army in the real war.

The seventh and final turning point was refusal of Hitler to produce or use Atomic or nuclear weapons. He banned them. Hitler, who had read an article of Heisenberg, said:" The effects would be terrible.. All kind of life, not only human life but also life of animals and plants would be exterminated for hundreds of years within a radius of 40 Kilometers ...... No nation; no group of civilized humans beings could consciously bear such responsibility. From strikes and counter strikes the human species would exterminate itself"

Unlike England or USA, Hitler never wanted world domination. Hitler's primary goals, as he made clear from Mein Kampf on, was 1) simply a plebiscite to allow people to rejoin Germany which had been cut in pieces in 1919 and 2) To rid the world of Communism and Communists. Hitler never wanted war.

“I believe now that Hitler and the German People did not want war.
BUT WE, {England}, DECLARED WAR ON GERMANY, INTENT ON DESTROYING IT, in accordance with our principle of Balance of Power, and we were encouraged by the 'Americans'{Jews} around Roosevelt. We ignored Hitler's pleading, not to enter into war. Now we are forced to realize
that Hitler was right. He offered us the co-operation of Germany: instead, since 1945, we have been facing the immense power of the Soviet Empire. I feel ashamed and humiliated to see that the aims we accused Hitler of, are being relentlessly pursued now, only under a different label."
(The British Attorney General Sir Hartle Shawcross, said in a speech at
Stourbridge, March 16, 1984 (AP)).

Kapel De