In Truth Behind Pearl Harbor, I told how Franklin Delano Roosevelt minutely planned a false flag operation to enter European war on the side of Communist Russia, to defeat anti Communist forces of Germany.
Here is a few excerpts by Curtis Dall son in law of Franklin Delano Roosevelt from his famous book; "FDR- My Exploited Father-in-Law." He also states that FDR had sent engraved invitation to Japan to attack pearl harbor;
" Page; 133
Fixed in my mind forever is the bizarre picture of General George Marshall reportedly riding his horse in the sunny Virginia countryside and his other doings in Washington on that fateful Sunday morning. His slothful warning messages, sent over slow channels, were merely a ghastly gesture, timed to arrive after the "surprise" attack, as a face-saving device.
How many of the 4 500 American casualties and how much of our enormous naval losses suffered at Pearl Harbor could have been avoided?
I have often wondered if, as part of a long-range plan, FDR deliberately ignored the possibility and danger of an attack on Pearl Harbor by the approaching massive Japanese Task Force, an attack made on us almost by engraved invitation. He must have! Then, if such were the case, he must have wanted it. Who told him to "want" it? What manner of leadership was that? Had the virus of great power so altered the chemistry and character of the man I was very fond of to such an extent that I could not recognize him? Could he be the same man whose arm I had once tightly held on numerous occasions as he walked, so he wouldn't fall? Was he the same man whose many hopes and aspirations we had once shared?
It certainly appeared doubtful, in fact, incredible!
No doubt it is mighty fine to wear a navy cape and appear at a prominent wind-blown spot on a heavy U.S. cruiser for a press picture. But, what about our Pearl Harbor casualty list? The tears? The debt? Why the betrayed dead?
Who told FDR that a "Pearl Harbor" was necessary? Did he fall for the one-world-despot theory? Was that where he was supposed to come in for Glory?
Accordingly, is it very hard for me to take in what occurred then? No, it is more than that. It is just impossible!
CHAPTER XXI - My Visit with Admiral Kimmel
Admiral Kimmel, more than any other Naval officer certainly knows the "score" about "Pearl Harbor" and can now state the truth.
Page 160
I remembered reading that Admiral William (Bull) Halsey wrote Admiral Kimmel, "You were left holding the bag." Yes, it is very clear that Admiral Kimmel was left "holding the bag", but it is becoming more clear that the "bag" he held was one not "made in Germany", as it were, but one "made in Washington."
Page 161
I said, "Admiral, why was your predecessor, Admiral Richardson, removed from his Command? "
Quick as a flash came his answer: "He wanted the Fleet based on our West Coast. In fact, he went to Washington, called on Stark [Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations] and pleaded with him and others there for such a move, in view of tensions beginning to shape up in the Far East. Richardson thought and stated that Pearl Harbor was difficult to defend with the available forces and equipment there; 360 degrees of ocean to look after, hard to keep the fleet adequately fueled, vulnerable to submarine attack, inadequate anti-aircraft guns supplied to the Army, all of which was quite true. Failing to make any headway with Admiral Stark, he decided to go and see the President. With him, he likewise pleaded for the Fleet in the Pacific to assume a safer and more strategic posture. Roosevelt gave him a deaf ear, would not listen! Finally, Richardson banged hard on the table with his fist, stating he had presented his recommendations to high authority, and left, returning to Hawaii.
"Soon, he (Admiral Richardson) was relieved of his Command and I found myself succeeding him. At once, I conferred with Richardson, told him I had nothing whatsoever to do with the matter in Washington, and told him that I agreed with his recommendations which were overruled."
Page 162
Continuing, the Admiral said, "Colonel Dall, interestingly enough, or perhaps significantly enough, I had not been long in that Command when an order came through from Washington for me to transfer several capital ships and some auxiliaries, including oilers, for duty in other areas, which reduced my strength about 20%. Then, several months later, in June of 1941, as I recall it, I was ordered to detach and transfer more capital ships. Becoming most disturbed by this time, I went to Washington and protested that order coming from Admiral Stark. I did manage to have the order somewhat modified by him, but I was further weakened—something which puzzled me no end."
At my indicated look of surprise, the Admiral continued, "To cap it all, in the late Fall of 1941, not very long before the attack occurred, the Navy Department in Washington ordered my three carriers detached, sending one to Wake, one to Midway and one back to home waters. So, on December 7, 1941, my fleet was deprived of carrier air strength. General Short had about 12 Army reconnaissance planes, of which only six were in operational condition for extended reconnaissance over water!"
The Admiral then arose and walked slowly about the room to stretch his legs, and continued his startling remarks.
"Colonel Dall, this may further surprise you, but I found out later that the Japanese Task Force approaching Pearl Harbor, had specific orders that if the American Forces at Pearl Harbor became alerted, before the attack was launched, their Task Force was to return, at once, to Japanese waters, without attacking! Hence, to me this explained why much vitally important information contained in the decoded and translated Japanese cables received in Washington was deliberately withheld from the U. S. Commanders at Hawaii, lest the Japs alter their plans to attack under the favorable conditions duly created for them by Washington."
Here, the Admiral quoted from a secret dispatch sent from Tokyo to the Japanese Embassy in Washington, D. C. on December 1, 1941 … "to prevent the United States from becoming unduly suspicious, we have been advising the press and others that though there are some wide differences between Japan and the United States, the negotiations are continuing. (The above is for only your information.)"
Page 163
"I never received this information", said Admiral Kimmel, adding, "Early on Saturday afternoon, December 6, 1941, a pilot message from Tokyo to their Washington Embassy was intercepted and decoded, indicating that a very important fourteen point message was then on its way to their Ambassador in Washington.
"By three o'clock that afternoon, December 6, 1941, thirteen of the fourteen points had been received, decoded by us and translated. Distribution was promptly made to the most important officers of government by midnight.
"When the thirteen points were delivered to the President in the White House about 9:00 P.M. (3:30 in the afternoon of Saturday in Hawaii), he remarked, 'This means war."'
Why was a radio message, via the excellent facilities of the Navy, to Admiral Kimmel and General Short—alerting them to their imminent danger, not promptly dispatched by the Commander-in-Chief of our Armed Forces, or by Admiral Stark, acting under his direction? That question is what hurts so badly to contemplate! Why?
Admiral Kimmel said to me, "Early the next day, the Sunday morning of December 7th, General Marshall and Admiral Stark met in the latter's office in the Navy Department. About 9:00 a.m., the 14th part of the Japanese message had just been intercepted, decoded and translated. The time was still only 3:30 a.m. at Pearl Harbor—plenty of time for the alert.
Page 164
"General Marshall was milling around in Stark's office, pretending he had not fully digested the thirteen parts received on Saturday afternoon. As for his horseback ride for most of Sunday morning in Virginia, so extensively publicized, that was a pure fabrication.
"Stark said to Marshall, ‘Let’s radio Kimmel, and alert him.’ Marshall replied, 'Let's not. It might be detected by the Japs, and complicate things.' " (Emphasis supplied.)
"Stark—I can reach him by Naval radio, in about 15 minutes.'
"Marshall—I’ll wire him later.'"
"And he finally did just that", exclaimed the Admiral, "Marshall sent me a regular commercial wire, via Western Union, indicating no urgency, or priority of treatment!"
Concluding the episode, the retired Commandant said, "Two, hours approximately, after the bombs had fallen, I did receive Marshall’s wire, via Western Union, and I was so damned mad to get a regular Western Union commercial wire then from him, that after reading it, I crumpled it up and threw it in the waste basked.”
See the entire book here;
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