Lies
being taught;
Mein
Kampf is unintelligible ravings of a maniac.
Now
the Truth; It is the opposite of what press has told
you
CHAPTER
XIII THE GERMAN POST-WAR POLICY OF ALLIANCES
Part 2-
Why it is in interest of England to ally
with Germany
If we
make an impartial examination of the situation existing in Europe to-day as far
as concerns the relation of the various Powers to one another, we shall arrive
at the following results:
For the past three hundred years the history
of our Continent has been definitely determined by England's efforts to keep
the European States opposed to one another in an equilibrium of forces, thus
assuring the necessary protection of her own rear while she pursued the great
aims of British world-policy of world domination.
The traditional tendency of British diplomacy
ever since the reign of Queen Elizabeth has been to employ systematically every
possible means to prevent any one Power from attaining a preponderant position
over the other European Powers and, if necessary, to break that preponderance
by means of armed intervention. The only parallel to this has been the
tradition of the Prussian Army. England has made use of various forces to carry
out its purpose, choosing them according to the actual situation or the task to
be faced; but the will and determination to use them has always been the same.
The more difficult England's position became in the course of history the more
the British Imperial Government considered it necessary to maintain a condition
of political paralysis among the various European States, as a result of their
mutual rivalries. When the North
American colonies obtained their political independence it became still more
necessary for England to use every effort to establish and maintain the defense
of her flank in Europe. In accordance with this policy she reduced Spain and
the Netherlands to the position of inferior naval Powers. Having accomplished
this, England concentrated all her forces against the increasing strength of
France, until she brought about the downfall of Napoleon Bonaparte and
therewith destroyed the military hegemony of France, which was the most
dangerous rival that England had to fear.
The
change of attitude in British statesmanship towards Germany took place only
very slowly, not only because the German nation did not represent an obvious
danger for England as long as it lacked national unification, but also because
public opinion in England, which had been directed to other quarters by a
system of propaganda that had been carried out for a long time, could be turned
to a new direction only by slow degrees.
As
early as 1870-71 England had decided on the new stand it would take. On certain
occasions minor oscillations in that policy were caused by the growing
influence of America in the commercial markets of the world and also by the
increasing political power of Russia; but, unfortunately, Germany did not take
advantage of these and, therefore, the original tendency of British diplomacy
was only reinforced.
England
looked upon Germany as a Power which was of world importance commercially and
politically and which, partly because of its enormous industrial development,
assumed such threatening proportions that the two countries already contended
against one another in the same sphere and with equal energy. The so-called
peaceful conquest of the world by commercial enterprise, which, in the eyes of
those who governed our public affairs at that time, represented the highest
peak of human wisdom, was just the thing that led English statesmen to adopt a
policy of resistance. That this resistance assumed the form of an organized
aggression on a vast scale was in full conformity with a type of statesmanship
which did not aim at the maintenance of a dubious world peace but aimed at the
consolidation of British world-hegemony. In carrying out this policy, England
allied herself with those countries which had a definite military importance.
And that was in keeping with her traditional caution in estimating the power of
her adversary and also in recognizing her own temporary weakness. That line of
conduct cannot be called unscrupulous; because such a comprehensive
organization for war purposes must not be judged from the heroic point of view
but from that of expediency. The object of a diplomatic policy must not be to
see that a nation goes down heroically but rather that it survives in a
practical way. Hence every road that leads to this goal is opportune and the
failure to take it must be looked upon as a criminal neglect of duty.
When the German Revolution took place
England's fears of a German world hegemony came to a satisfactory end.
From
that time it was not an English interest to see Germany totally cancelled from
the geographic map of Europe. On the contrary, the astounding collapse which
took place in November 1918 found British diplomacy confronted with a situation
which at first appeared untenable.
For
four-and-a-half years the British Empire had fought to break the presumed
preponderance of a Continental Power. A sudden collapse now happened which
removed this Power from the foreground of European affairs. That collapse
disclosed itself finally in the lack of even the primordial instinct of
self-preservation, so that European equilibrium was destroyed within
forty-eight hours. Germany was
annihilated and France became the first political Power on the Continent of
Europe.
The
tremendous propaganda which was carried on during this war for the purpose of
encouraging the British public to stick it out to the end aroused all the
primitive instincts and passions of the populace and was bound eventually to
hang as a leaden weight on the decisions of British statesmen. With the
colonial, economical and commercial destruction of Germany, England's war aims
were attained. Whatever went beyond those aims was an obstacle to the
furtherance of British interests. Only the enemies of England could profit by the
disappearance of Germany as a Great Continental Power in Europe. In November
1918, however, and up to the summer of 1919, it was not possible for England to
change its diplomatic attitude; because during the long war it had appealed,
more than it had ever done before, to the feelings of the populace. In view of
the feeling prevalent among its own people, England could not change its
foreign policy; and another reason which made that impossible was the military
strength to which other European Powers had now attained. France had taken the
direction of peace negotiations into her own hands and could impose her law
upon the others. During those months of negotiations and bargaining the only
Power that could have altered the course which things were taking was Germany
herself; but Germany was torn by a civil war, and her so-called statesmen had
declared themselves ready to accept any and every dictate imposed on them.
Now,
in the comity of nations, when one nation loses its instinct for
self-preservation and ceases to be an active member it sinks to the level of an
enslaved nation and its territory will have to suffer the fate of a colony.
To
prevent the power of France from becoming too great, the only form which
English negotiations could take was that of participating in France's lust for
aggrandizement.
As a
matter of fact, England did not attain the ends for which she went to war. Not
only did it turn out impossible to prevent a Continental Power from obtaining a
preponderance over the ratio of strength in the Continental State system of
Europe, but a large measure of preponderance had been obtained and firmly
established.
In
1914 Germany, considered as a military State, was wedged in between two
countries, one of which had equal military forces at its disposal and the other
had greater military resources. Then there was England's overwhelming supremacy
at sea. France and Russia alone hindered and opposed the excessive
aggrandizement of Germany. The unfavourable geographical situation of the
REICH, from the military point of view, might be looked upon as another
coefficient of security against an exaggerated increase of German power. From
the naval point of view, the configuration of the coast-line was unfavourable
in case of a conflict with England. And though the maritime frontier was short
and cramped, the land frontier was widely extended and open.
France's position is different to-day. It is
the first military Power without a serious rival on the Continent. It is almost
entirely protected by its southern frontier against Spain and Italy. Against
Germany it is safeguarded by the prostrate condition of our country. A long
stretch of its coast-line faces the vital nervous system of the British Empire.
Not only could French airplanes and long-range batteries attack the vital
centers of the British system, but submarines can threaten the great British
commercial routes. A submarine campaign based on France's long Atlantic coast
and on the European and North African coasts of the Mediterranean would have disastrous
consequences for England.
Thus
the political results of the war to prevent the development of German power was
the creation of a French hegemony on the Continent. The military result was the
consolidation of France as the first Continental Power and the recognition of
American equality on the sea. The economic result was the cession of great
spheres of British interests to her former allies and associates.
The
Balkanization of Europe, up to a certain degree, was desirable and indeed
necessary in the light of the traditional policy of Great Britain, just as
France desired the Balkanization of Germany.
What
England has always desired, and will continue to desire, is to prevent any one
Continental Power in Europe from attaining a position of world importance.
Therefore England wishes to maintain a definite equilibrium of forces among the
European States--for this equilibrium seems a necessary condition of England's
world-hegemony.
What
France has always desired, and will continue to desire, is to prevent Germany
from becoming a homogeneous Power. Therefore France wants to maintain a system
of small German States whose forces would balance one another and over which
there should be no central government. Then, by acquiring possession of the
left bank of the Rhine, she would have fulfilled the pre-requisite conditions
for the establishment and security of her hegemony in Europe.
The
final aims of French diplomacy must be in perpetual opposition to the final
tendencies of British statesmanship.
Taking these considerations as a
starting-point, anyone who investigates the possibilities that exist for
Germany to find allies must come to the conclusion that there remains no other
way of forming an alliance except to approach England. The
consequences of England's war policy were and are disastrous for Germany.
However, we cannot close our eyes to the fact that, as things stand to-day, the
necessary interests of England no longer demand the destruction of Germany. On
the contrary, British diplomacy must tend more and more, from year to year,
towards curbing France's unbridled lust after hegemony. Now, a policy of
alliances cannot be pursued by bearing past grievances in mind, but it can be
rendered fruitful by taking account of past experiences. Experience should have
taught us that alliances formed for negative purposes suffer from intrinsic
weakness. The destinies of nations can be welded together only under the
prospect of a common success, of common gain and conquest, in short, a common
extension of power for both contracting parties.
The
ignorance of our people on questions of foreign politics is clearly
demonstrated by the reports in the daily Press which talk about
"friendship towards Germany" on the part of one or the other foreign
statesman, whereby this professed friendship is taken as a special guarantee
that such persons will champion a policy that will be advantageous to our
people. That kind of talk is absurd to an incredible degree. It means
speculating on the unparalleled simplicity of the average German philistine
when he comes to talking politics. There is not any British, American, or
Italian statesman who could ever be described as 'pro-German'. Every Englishman
must naturally be British first of all. The same is true of every American. And
no Italian statesman would be prepared to adopt a policy that was not
pro-Italian. Therefore, anyone who expects to form alliances with foreign
nations on the basis of a pro-German feeling among the statesmen of other
countries is either an ass or a deceiver. The necessary condition for linking
together the destinies of nations is never mutual esteem or mutual sympathy,
but rather the prospect of advantages accruing to the contracting parties. It
is true that a British statesman will always follow a pro-British and not a
pro-German policy; but it is also true that certain definite interests involved
in this pro-British policy may coincide on various grounds with German
interests. Naturally that can be so only to a certain degree and the situation
may one day be completely reversed. But the art of statesmanship is shown when
at certain periods there is question of reaching a certain end and when allies
are found who must take the same road in order to defend their own interests.
The
practical application of these principles at the present time must depend on
the answer given to the following questions: What States are not vitally
interested in the fact that, by the complete abolition of a German Central
Europe, the economic and military power of France has reached a position of
absolute hegemony? Which are the States that, in consideration of the
conditions which are essential to their own existence and in view of the
tradition that has hitherto been followed in conducting their foreign policy,
envisage such a development as a menace to their own future?
Finally,
we must be quite clear on the following point: France is and will remain the
implacable enemy of Germany. It does not matter what Governments have ruled or
will rule in France, whether Bourbon or Jacobin, Napoleonic or
Bourgeois-Democratic, Clerical Republican or Red Bolshevik, their foreign
policy will always be directed towards acquiring possession of the Rhine
frontier and consolidating France's position on this river by disuniting and
dismembering Germany.
England
did not want Germany to be a world Power. France desired that there should be
no Power called Germany. Therefore there was a very essential difference.
To-day we are not fighting for our position as a World-Power but only for the
existence of our country, for national unity and the daily bread of our
children. Taking this point of view into consideration, only two States remain
to us as possible allies in Europe--England and Italy.
England
is not pleased to see a France on whose military power there is no check in
Europe, so that one day she might undertake the support of a policy which in
some way or other might come into conflict with British interests. Nor can
England be pleased to see France in possession of such enormous coal and iron mines
in Western Europe as would make it possible for her one day to play a role in
world-commerce which might threaten danger to British interests. Moreover,
England can never be pleased to see a France whose political position on the
Continent, owing to the dismemberment of the rest of Europe, seems so
absolutely assured that she is not only able to resume a French world-policy on
great lines but would even find herself compelled to do so. The bombs which
were once dropped by the Zeppelins might be multiplied by the thousand every
night. The military predominance of France is a weight that presses heavily on
the hearts of the World Empire over which Great Britain rules.
Nor
can Italy desire, nor will she desire, any further strengthening of France's
power in Europe. The future of Italy will be conditioned by the development of
events in the Mediterranean and by the political situation in the area
surrounding that sea. The reason that led Italy into the War was not a desire
to contribute towards the aggrandizement of France but rather to deal her hated
Adriatic rival a mortal blow. Any further increase of France's power on the
Continent would hamper the development of Italy's future, and Italy does not
deceive herself by thinking that racial kindred between the nations will in any
way eliminate rivalries.
Serious
and impartial consideration proves that it is these two States, Great Britain
and Italy, whose natural interests not only do not contrast with the conditions
essential to the existence of the German nation but are identical with them, to
a certain extent.
Adolf
Hitler
